Although we do not discuss all of Bluehorse's challenges, we have fully considered them and conclude that none furnishes a basis upon which to sustain the protest. As explained above, the solicitation's delivery and quantity terms provided: All fuel delivery must be coordinated with the construction manager who will schedule delivery dates and quantities. Contrary to the contracting officer's repeated assertions, however, we do not construe the solicitation as requiring the agency to issue an order for the delivery of 4,000 gallons of fuel at a time.
Material terms are those terms that affect the price, quantity, quality, or delivery of the goods or services being provided. For this reason, we find the agency's decision to rescind the order to Bluehorse to be unobjectionable. Where a dispute exists as to a solicitation's actual requirements, we begin by examining the plain language of the solicitation. For this reason, the solicitation afforded the agency the discretion to issue an order providing for the delivery of 4,000 gallons of fuel at a time, as the agency did here.
Moreover, an agency need not delay a procurement simply to accommodate Bannums choice of approach to meeting the agencys requirements.
See Erickson Aero Tanker, B-411306.2, B-411306.5, July 29, 2015, 2015 CPD 226 at 11.
Again, as previously indicated, the protesters business decision to enter into the contingent agreement with the property owner was the reason why it could not satisfy the solicitations facility requirement. B-414336: May 15, 2017)Soliel protests that it did everything that it was required to do in redacting its identity (and that of its subcontractor) from its proposal, including not naming itself or its subcontractor, and removing any identifying information (for example, company logos, addresses or employee names) that comprised the offering team.
As noted above, offering a site change at this point in time is not an option under the terms of the solicitation.
In support of its position, Bannum notes that the agency has previously issued interim contracts during the pendency of the current procurement and that issuing another interim award would allow Bannum the time it would need to find a new property. Further, we have indicated that it is the contracting agencys right to determine when the offer and negotiation stage of a procurement is finished; an offeror has no legal right to insist that negotiations be reopened after final proposal revisions have been submitted. We see nothing to support the protesters contention that the agency acted unreasonably in rejecting the proposal for failing to document a current right to use the facility.
In reviewing protests challenging the evaluation of proposals, we do not conduct a new evaluation or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but examine the record to determine whether the agencys judgment was reasonable and in accord with the solicitation criteria. In this regard, we reject Bannums contention that the agency acted unreasonably by not allowing the protester additional time to find a new location given the delay in the award.
First, there was nothing in the solicitation establishing that the agency would make an award by a certain date, and the protester has failed to cite any law or regulation otherwise requiring the agency to have made award by an earlier date.
Second, by the express terms of the solicitation, an offeror could only request a site change within 60 days after initial proposals were submitted.